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POLITICAL IMPEDIMENTS TO THE RESUMPTION OF LABOR MIGRATION
TO WESTERN EUROPE
This article argues that traditional, labor migration flows to Western
Europe are unlikely to resume in the near future and the European
Community's free movement of labor policy is likely to erode in light of
the recent advance of anti-immigrant illiberalism in Western Europe.
Anti-immigrant illiberalism in several, major labor-importing states is
evident in: 1) the semi-permament politicization of state immigration
policy; 2) the surge of support for xenophobic political forces; 3) the
appropriation of anti-immigrant votes by established political parties
of the right; and 4) the abandonment by left parties of liberal
immigration and immigrant welfare policies.
POLITICAL IMPEDIMENTS TO THE RESUMPTION OF LABOR MIGRATION
TO WESTERN EUROPE
A decade and a half has passed since the state-sponsored recruitment of
foreign workers to Western Europe came to an end. Beginning with the
1973 oil shock and the prolonged economic recession which soon followed,
the major labor-importing states in Western Europe suspended mass
immigration and the employment of foreigners. As Rogers has correctly
observed, the suspension of organized, state-sponsored immigration in
the early 1970s did not curtail all new immigration. Superimposed upon
the more visible and measurable trends of "family reunification of year-
round migrants in the host countries, the sporadic admittance of 'new'
year-round migrant workers from the old recruitment countries, and the
traditional situation of free movement of labor" during the late 1970s
and 1980s were less noticeable patterns "in the contemporary European
migratory system, such as seasonal migration, border commuting, asylum
requests and refugee movements, illegal migration, and migrations in the
increasingly wider spheres of free movement of labor" (Rogers, 1985:
288). Nevertheless, by the late 1970s most West European governments
and major employers had ceased to recruit foreign labor actively and
several governments were facilitating the voluntary repatriation of
previously settled workers (See, Friedlander, 1985). Into and
throughout the 1980s sluggish economic growth has combined with high
unemployment and often virulent anti-immigrant, public sentiment to
reduce the flow of year-round foreign workers into the advanced
industrial economies of Western Europe.
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aThe central question we wish to raise but, for obvious reasons,
cannot answer definitively is whether the mass flow of migrant labor to
Western Europe, after having been suspended for so long, can be resumed
in the near future. That is, in the somewhat unlikely event that West
European economies again experience high economic growth rates and near
full employment, can traditional sources of foreign labor be retapped?
Although these are hypothetical questions, addressing them is not merely
an academic exercise. For, in raising these questions, we are
implicitly asking what political costs might accompany the full economic
and political integration of a country like Turkey, a traditional labor-
exporting state, into the European Community (EC). Indeed, we are also
raising the issue of whether a future European Community of thirteen or
fourteen mostly rich and several obviously much poorer members can
indefinitely allow the free movement of labor within its borders without
precipitating severe, internal political tensions.
Our central argument is that previous labor migration patterns are
unlikely to resume and the EC's commitment to the free movement of labor
within its borders will likely erode in the near future as a consequence
of anti-immigrant illiberalism having become 'embedded' since the mid-
1970s in the domestic politics of several major labor-importing West
European countries. The embeddedness of anti-immigrant illiberalism in
West European politics is evident in: 1) the semi-permanent
politicization of state immigration policy; 2) the modest surge of
popular and/or electoral support for xenophobic movements and political
parties; 3) the deliberate appropriation of anti-immigrant votes by
established, respectable parties of the conservative right; and 4) the
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abandonment by left parties of liberal immigration and immigrant welfare
policies. Together these trends have converged to foster an unfavorable
political climate for the renewal of mass labor migration to Western
Europe and to obstruct, in the short term at least, the full economic,
political, and social integration of the approximately 14.5 million
already settled, ethnic and racial immigrant minorities (Table 1).
Continuing domestic problems of ethnic and racial minority integration
diminish in turn the prospect that a new, more liberal immigration
regime will emerge in Western Europe.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
THE POLITICIZATION OF STATE IMMIGRATION POLICY
Perhaps the most significant political factor impeding the resumption of
previous labor migration patterns is the semi-permanent politicization
of state immigration policy in Western Europe. By state immigration
policy being politicized we mean simply that in contrast to the period
(mostly before 1970) when European publics were unaware of state
immigration policy, when it was not an electoral issue, and when it was
conceived and implemented in relatively closed arenas by civil servants,
bureaucrats, and economic planners, immigration policy is now widely
known to the public, debated during electoral campaigns and in
relatively open arenas (like legislatures), and scrutinized by
politicians, extra-parliamentary pressure groups, the mass media, and
very often, organized labor.
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The politicization of state immigration policy in West Germany
after 1975 is a significant case in point. Until the 1973 oil shock,
and even some time after it, West German immigration policy was
exclusively the concern of the executive; the political parties and the
Parliament in West Germany were largely excluded from the decision-
making process. Katzenstein (1987: 213) observes that "until the late
1970s West Germany's migrant labor policy was remarkable for the lack of
public debate it provoked." However, with the suspension of the German
"economic miracle" and the expansion of the foreign resident population
to over four million during the 1970s, the immigration issue became
politically salient in West Germany, thus forcing "policy-makers to
confront the social consequences of decisions made largely for economic
reasons" (Hoskin and Fitzgerald, 1987). Since the early 1980s opinion
polls indicate that over three-quarters of West Germans believe that
there are too many foreigners in their country and over 40 percent of
the electorate agrees that foreign workers should be repatriated when
unemployment is high (Hoskin and Fitzgerald, 1987). A series of
provocative events, such as the publication of the inflammatory
"Heidelberg Manifesto" by a group of prominent intellectuals and the
anti-immigrant comments of Prime Minister Helmut Kohl and other major,
German political party leaders, have substantially raised the public
visibility of state immigration policy in West Germany during the 1980s
(Bendix, 1985). Indeed, it would probably be no exaggeration to state
that few West Germans are unaware of or indifferent to state immigration
policy. A similar conclusion could also be reached about the British
and French electorate (See, Freeman, 1979; 1986).
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The politicization of state immigration policy in Western Europe
impedes the resumption of previous labor migration patterns for two
reasons. First, before state immigration policy in countries such as
Britain and West Germany can be significantly altered (i.e. liberalized)
proposed changes must be debated publicly. In a very significant sense
the immigration issue is unlike most questions of public policy. In no
West European country can politicians or political parties gain votes by
favoring new immigration and in virtually every country thousands, and
often millions, of votes could be and probably would be lost. In regard
to West Germany Hoskin and Fitzgerald (1987) argue that the major
political parties "cannot confess to liking the influx of immigrants,
even if they can often see an advantage to their arrival or a real cost
to trying to shut them out." In short, widespread public opposition to
immigration combines with the high visibility of the issue to obstruct
liberal change in public policy.
Second, because state immigration policy is politicized liberal
change can be fairly easily obstructed by a small minority of
immigration opponents. The opponents of immigration have the political
advantage because in any future conflict over the direction of
immigration policy the forces against new immigration could mobilize far
more votes and political resources than the proponents of liberal
change. The considerable mobilizing capacity of the opponents of
immigration is not simply due to the hostility of European publics
toward immigrants, although this is an important factor, but because
these publics are already aware of the issue, do not require additional
education, and must simply be persuaded to support the policy status
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quo. On the other hand, the prospective advocates of liberalization
would be faced with the formidable and time-consuming task of re-
educating or, in some countries, educating the public on the benefits of
immigration and justifying change in the status quo. Needless to say,
if European publics were less aware of state immigration policies and if
state decisions in this area of public policy could be implemented
without the approval of political parties and the legislature the
liberalization of immigration policy would be far easier to effect. It
is no surprise, therefore, that those who oppose new immigration are
working diligently to keep immigration and immigrant-related issues in
the political spotlight (New Statesman, 1987).
THE SURGE OF XENOPHOBIC GROUPS, MOVEMENTS, AND POLITICAL PARTIES
At the forefront of this effort are xenophobic groups, movements, and
political parties. The surge of xenophobic forces in Western Europe in
recent years should not be overemphasized or exaggerated. In no West
European country are these forces capable of forcing radical changes in
national immigration or immigrant welfare policy. None are on the verge
of a major electoral breakthrough. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied
that since the early 1970s the political climate in Western Europe has
become much more favorable for extreme right forces -- in some countries
referred to as the "New Right" (Cohen et.al., 1986) In several
countries these forces have achieved modest political and/or electoral
advances.
For example, the British National Front (NF), at the peak of its
popularity during the late 1970s, enjoyed the implicit support of as
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much as 15 percent of the electorate. In one opinion survey conducted
in 1978 21 percent of all respondents agreed that it would be "good for
Britain" if the Front gained seats in the House of Commons (Harrop
et.al., 1980). Between 1972 and 1978 it was not unusual for National
Front candidates to receive between 8 and 16 percent of the vote in
local elections and parliamentary by-elections. In the 1979 general
election 303 National Front candidates garnered 191,000 votes.
In somewhat parallel circumstances in France, the French National
Front (FN) has emerged as a significant political force since 1983. In
the June 1984 elections for the European Parliament the National Front
list, headed by Jean-Marie Le Pen, attracted almost 10 percent of the
vote. Five months following the election the percentage of sympathizers
of the FN in the electorate surged from 18 to 23 (Schain, 1987). In the
national parliamentary elections held in 1986 the FN won 35 seats and
9.8 percent of the vote, as exit polls conducted during the election
revealed ominously that 67 percent of all voters who supported the
National Front in 1984 remained loyal in 1986. In April, 1988 Le Pen
shook the political foundations of French conservatism by garnering 14.4
percent of the vote in the first round of the presidential elections.
In the city of Marseilles the National Front standard bearer emerged as
the most popular presidential candidate with 28.3 percent of the vote.
Although the FN lost all but one of its 35 seats in the National
Assembly after the most recent parliamentary elections in June, 1988,
this result was not due to a significant erosion in its electoral
appeal. The National Front received 9.6 percent of the vote in 1988,
approximately the same electoral support that the party had received two
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years earlier, but a change in the electoral system in 1988 denied the
FN significant representation in Parliament.
In West Germany public violence against settled immigrants is
visibly on the rise. The violence is fueled in part by the modest
growth of neo-Nazi and New Right groups which are splintered into 74
separate organizations with 22,000 total members. The most significant
group, with approximately 16,000 members, is the German Peoples Union
(DVU) led by Gerhard Frey. The next largest group, with 6100 members,
is the National Democratic Party (NPD). The NPD may have had its
electoral heyday before 1970: in 1969 the party received 4.3 percent of
the vote in the federal elections as compared to 0.6 percent of the vote
the NPD garnered in 1987. However, the NPD's performance in the March,
1988 Baden-Wurttemberg state elections, where it received 2.1 percent of
the vote, has revived the spirits of the party's leaders. On the
extreme, neo-Nazi right are the Free German Workers Party (FAP) and
other groups (New Statesman, 1987; Castles, et. al., 1984).
In Denmark, the anti-tax, Progress party increased its national
representation in Parliament in September, 1987 from 4 to 9 after a
hostile electoral campaign against guest workers and especially Iranian
and Lebanese refugees. The party's parliamentary delegation expanded
further to 16 after the May, 1988 general election. The Norwegian
Progress party, with two seats in the Storting and 12 percent of the
vote in recent local elections, has also successfully exploited the
popular backlash against settled immigrants. In a recent public opinion
survey the Norwegian party scored over 23 percent, as compared with the
3.1 percent of the vote it received in the 1985 general election (The
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Economist, 1988).
The modest surge of popular and/or electoral support for these and
other xenophobic groups in Western Europe (Table 2). is significant for
two major reasons. First, as existing vehicles of anti-immigrant and
anti-immigration popular expression, these groups are patiently waiting
to be more fully utilized and embraced. Most of these groups are poised
to attract additional popular support and to capitalize politically on
any shift toward a more liberal immigration regime in Western Europe.
Second, the existence of these groups is preventing established,
'respectable' parties of the right and center-right from moving too far
away from anti-immigration positions. In Sartori-like fashion the
xenophobic groups are pulling the established, conservative parties
further to the right on immigration as part of a general process of
political outflanking or outbidding (Sartori, 1977: 139-144). In
several cases, the conservative parties fear losing votes to these
xenophobic groups or ceding to them control over the public debate on
immigration and immigrants. In either event, the probability that mass
migration to Western Europe will be renewed is diminished considerably.
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
THE APPROPRIATION OF ANTI-IMIGRANT VOTES BY RIGHT AND CENTER-RIGHT
PARTIES
In virtually every West European country where public sentiment against
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immigration is pervasive and popular support for far right groups is
insignificant or declining, it is because the established, conservative
parties are unambiguously opposed to new immigration and illiberal
toward settled immigrants. The British case is a classic example. In
contrast to the early to mid-1960s when it was fairly liberal on
immigration and concerned about the social welfare of settled workers,
the British Conservative party of the 1980s is staunchly opposed to
immigration and illiberal toward the new ethnic minorities settled in
the U.K. (Layton-Henry, 1984: 147-165; Messina, 1985). The reasons
behind the transformation of the Conservative party are complex. The
party's shift in policy is at least partly a response to the pressure of
illiberal opinion within the British electorate. However, this is
hardly the whole and perhaps not even most of the story, the rest of
which we will elaborate upon below. At this point we wish to stress
that the Conservative party's illiberalism on immigration and immigrant
welfare is probably the key reason why the British National Front
declined in popular and electoral support during the late 1970s and
early 1980s (Messina, 1987). Indeed, it could be argued that as long,
and perhaps only so long, as the Conservative party remains illiberal
the British National Front is unlikely to revive as a political
movement.
The appropriation of the National Front's illiberal platform by the
Conservative party has not been accomplished without cost. In addition
to the fact that primary migration to the U.K. from outside the EC has
all but ended and Britain has some of the most xenophobic nationality
and immigration laws in Western Europe, is the reality that the success
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of the Conservative party in appropriating anti-immigrant votes has
driven the National Front and other far right groups into the streets
where they have incited racial violence (Home Office, 1981; Layton-
Henry, 1984: 108-121). Thus, settled immigrant workers and their
dependents in Britain ultimately pay for the political decline of the
National Front in two ways: first, with the imposition of restrictive
immigration and nationality laws which obstruct family reunification;
and second, as frequent victims of racial attacks. Under such
circumstances it is hardly surprising that some settled workers and
their families in Britain remain open to returning to Pakistan, India,
the West Indies, and other countries of origin (Time, 1984).
The British Conservative party is certainly not unique in Western
Europe. To one degree or another its illiberal orientation and behavior
toward settled immigrants have been mimicked by the Christian Democratic
party in West Germany, the Gaullists and UDF in France, and other West
- - European right and center-right political parties (Castles et. al.,
1984; New York Times, 1988). In all these cases the respectable
political right has become so closely identified in the public mind with
anti-immigration and illiberal immigrant policies, and in many instances
benefitted electorally from these policies, that it is extremely
unlikely that it would support new immigration in the foreseeable
future.
THE ABANDONMENT OF LIBERAL POLICIES BY LEFT PARTIES
Perhaps the greatest change in the domestic context in which state
immigration policy is conceived and implemented in Western Europe is the
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quiet acceptance of restrictive immigration policies by established
parties of the left and, in some instances, their abandonment of
liberal, immigrant welfare policies. To be sure, this trend is not
universal. The Dutch Labour party (PvdA), for example, has recently
promised to improve the social welfare of settled foreign workers. As a
result, in the 1986 local elections in The Netherlands non-national
immigrants, granted limited suffrage since 1983, overwhelmingly voted
Labour. Also, the British Labour party, after distancing itself between
1964 and 1975 from the aspirations of recently settled immigrants, has
actively courted ethnic minority voters during the 1980s (Messina,
1985). Nevertheless, in several major countries, most notably in France
and West Germany, established left political parties have moved away
from supporting a liberal immigration regime and distanced themselves
politically from settled workers. In France, this process has reached
its logical and somewhat bizarre extreme: the French Communist party
now competes with the National Front for anti-immigrant votes (Schain,
1987).
The quiet acceptance of an illiberal immigration regime by the left
and its abandonment of liberal, immigrant welfare policies has had at
least two major consequences. First, it has shifted the public debate
on immigration policy in Western Europe so far to the right that in most
countries only a more liberal family reunification policy is possible in
the near future -- regardless of economic conditions. In the absence of
a concrete alternative to the current, restrictive immigration regime it
is difficult to see how any government or party -- including the left --
could construct one in the near future. Second, the illiberal drift of
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the left on immigration and immigrant welfare policy has reinforced the
legitimacy of the views of the far right. The illiberal drift of the
left has especially encouraged the white working class and more than a
few trade unions to blame foreign workers for high, domestic
unemployment.
ANTI-IMMIGRANT ILLIBERALISM. AND THE CONSERVATIVE PROJECT
At this point we must link the above trends to larger macro-political
and economic developments in Western Europe during the 1980s.
Specifically, our analysis suggests the following questions: don't the
trends which we have identified alter, and possibly reverse, if full
employment and general prosperity return to Western Europe? Don't West
European political parties and publics become more receptive to liberal
immigration policies and become more tolerant of immigrants during a
sustained upturn in the economy? Why is anti-immigrant illiberalism
necessarily embedded in the domestic politics of Western Europe?
These questions return us to the British case and the motives of
the Conservative party, under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher, in
appropriating the platform of the British National Front during the late
1970s. The apparent motive was short-term, electoral gain. As the
Conservatives had lost four of five previous general elections, there
was some pressure within the party to collect votes from wherever it
could -- even on the xenophobic right. Both private and public opinion
polls in the mid-1970s indicated the electoral gains that could be
achieved if the party became explicitly hostile toward immigrants
(Layton-Henry, 1984: 150). Such gains would have been especially
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welcome given the near even popular support of the major political
parties at the time. Moreover, there is reason to believe that the
leaders of the Conservative party were concerned about losing votes to
the National Front, especially in certain electorally marginal,
parliamentary constituencies. When asked in January, 1978 whether she
hoped to woo defectors to the National Front back to the Conservative
party Thatcher replied:
Oh, very much back, certainly, but I think that the
National Front has, in fact, attracted more people
from Labour voters than from us; but never be afraid
to tackle something which people are worried about.
We are not in politics to ignore people's worries:
we are in politics to deal with them (The Times,
1978).
These remarks, coupled with Thatcher's infamous and premeditated
reference to the "swamping" of Britain by people of different cultures,
were a fairly transparent attempt by the Conservative party leader to
steal the anti-immigrant clothes of the National Front.
However, short-term, electoral gain was probably not the principal
reason why the Conservative party appropriated the National Front's
platform, as this motive does not explain why, after the National Front
collapsed politically in 1979 and the Conservatives won landslide
general election victories in 1983 and 1987, the party has not become
more liberal. Indeed, Britain currently has the fastest growing economy
in Western Europe, declining unemployment, and over the past four years
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or so has experienced a mini-economic boom. Yet, petty barriers to new
immigration were enacted by Thatcher's Conservative government as
recently as November, 1987 (New Society, 1987). Paradoxically, in a
country where undiluted liberalism has been revived as a governing
ideology and under a proselytizing, free market government a trickle of
foreign workers and the dependents of settled immigrants are being
vigorously excluded from entry into Britain.
Rather, the illiberal direction of immigration and immigrant
welfare policies in Britain and elsewhere in Western Europe is primarily
a consequence of the ascendency of what might be labelled the
'conservative project.' The essential features of this project are well
known and have been the focus of considerable scholarship (See,
Bosanquet, 1983; Burnham, 1978; Hall, 1986; Krieger, 1986). At its core
the conservative project is an attempt by conservative forces in Western
Europe to restructure the state and society so as to revitalize the
economy and make private capital more profitable. It is associated with
an intellectual attack on the principles underpinning the postwar,
Keynesian-social welfare consensus in Western Europe and a return by
governments to more market-oriented, economic policies. As a necessary
and direct consequence of this project, consensus politics breaks down,
ideological conflict heats up, and "economic sacrifice as apportioned by
the market ... [falls] ... predominantly on those who lack the market
power to protect themselves - young school leavers, immigrants, the
unskilled, and older workers in declining sectors" (Hall, 1986: 283).
Dissatisfaction and disillusion among the native 'losers' of this
project are muted somewhat by the promotion by elites and the
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consumption by publics of a governing political ideology which
emphasizes individualism, self-initiative, national pride, and the
potential threat to the 'nation' from internal enemies. As Hall (1986:
136) argues with respect to the political orientation of the
Conservative governments under Thatcher:
The strategy chosen by the Thatcher government has been ...
exclusionary and conflictual ...
Higher levels of social conflict were the natural result of
policies that renounced bargaining in favor of more
unilaterial state action; but there has also been an element
of deliberate divisiveness in the strategy. The Prime
Minister practices a 'politics of friends and enemies'
designed to win support by rallying national opposition to a
few groups designated as antagonists. Prominent among the
latter were international foes ... but several internal groups
have also been treated as enemies of the nation, including
inner-city rioters, football hooligans, drug dealers, and
striking trade unions.
At its most benign, the politics of friends and enemies distracts native
losers of the conservative project from discovering the primary source
of their difficulties. At its most malignant, the politics of friends
and enemies inflames latent antagonisms among the various races and
classes. At every point between these poles the eventual success of the
conservative project is facilitated.
Freeman argues that postwar migration has eroded the political
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consensus on which the postwar welfare state in Western Europe rests.
His thesis is that mass migration "reduced the political clout of those
social strata that have traditionally been the chief source of support
for welfare state development," thus precipitating "the Americanization
of European welfare politics." Specifically, postwar, mass migration
"diminished the power of organized labor by dividing the working class
into national and immigrant camps, by easing the tight labor market
conditions that would have enhanced labor's strategic resources, and by
provoking a resurgence of right-wing and nativist political movements"
(1986: 61). This thesis has obvious merit, but it essentially misses
the mark. On the whole, support for the welfare state in Western Europe
has not diminished considerably since the mid-1970s, even in the United
Kindgom where the Conservative party has been continuously in government
for a decade (Curtice, 1987). Moreover, it could be argued that it is
not so much the presence of foreign workers in Western Europe which has
undermined political support for the welfare state but, rather, a
conservative-led attack on the welfare state which has heated up the
ideological temperature of European politics and fostered a favorable
climate for immigrant bashing and an unfavorable climate for the
initiation of significant, new immigration. In its zeal to rally
popular support for the goals of the conservative project and to
undermine the Keynesian-social welfare consensus, the conservative right
in Western Europe has deliberately and somewhat successfully appealed to
racist and xenophobic sentiment within the electorate (Castles, 1986).
In Britain and elsewhere in Western Europe the conservative project
has not yet fully accomplished its objectives. Yet, even if it did, it
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would take some time for the ideological temperature of European
politics to cool and even a longer period for a pragmatic, more liberal
approach toward immigration to emerge. Within this context it must be
remembered that postwar, mass migration to Western Europe was largely
possible until 1973 because a broad consensus on public policy existed
among economic and political elites, a consensus which was pragmatic,
liberal, and receptive to the strategy of utilizing immigrant workers to
remedy labor shortages (Kesselman, et. al., 1987). But, as Freeman
(1986) appropriately reminds us, the extent to which labor supplies are
or are not adequate is, at least in part, determined politically.
Specifically, governments and political parties play a crucial role in
deciding whether the expansion of the economy and increases in
industrial production lead to capital-intensive modernization,
production speedups, and shift work or whether indigenous labor is
allowed to resist these pressures and foreign workers are recruited to
fill the labor shortages created by a booming economy. Given the
illiberal, political climate in contemporary Western Europe, the
ascendancy of the conservative project, and the political retreat of
organized labor it is probable that the initial response of governments
to economic expansion and full employment in the future will be to
squeeze greater productivity out of native labor and settled foreign
workers. Indeed, most European governments will have little choice.
Having undermined the legitimacy of their previous decision to allow
mass migration, governments and political parties -- especially on the
right -- have restricted their options with regard to future immigration
policy.
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ANTI-IMMIGRANT ILLIBERALISM AND THE FREE MOVEMENT OF LABOR
To date, the advance of anti-immigrant illiberalism in Western Europe
has not seriously undermined the principle or practice of the free
movement of labor within the European Community. The hostility of
elites and mass publics toward foreign workers has been directed, for
the most part, toward non-EC nationals such as Pakistanis in Britain,
Turks in West Germany, and North Africans in Belgium and France and not,
for example, toward EC nationals such as Portuguese workers in France or
Italians in Britain. Major political party leaders such as Margaret
Thatcher, Helmut Kohl, Jacques Chirac, and the Belgian Interior
Minister, Joseph Michael, have primarily confined their xenophobic
rhetoric to non-EC targets. Nevertheless, there is scattered evidence
that the advance of anti-immigrant illiberalism may be eroding popular
support for the free movement of labor within the EC.
In France, for example, public opinion surveys conducted in the
early 1980s recorded that up to half of respondents felt that there were
"too many" Spaniards and Portuguese in the country (Castles et. al.,
1984: 192). Politicians and officials in West Germany, in repeated,
public declarations since the 1970s that Germany is not a country of
immigration, do not distinguish between non-EC and EC immigration.
Moreover, since the southern expansion of the Community during the
1980s, public opinion surveys have consistently indicated that there is
a clear hierarchy of opinion among European publics about the
"trustworthiness" of peoples from other EC countries. On the whole, the
populations of traditional, labor-importing states (e.g. Britain,
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France, The Netherlands, West Germany) view citizens from similar states
more favorably than the populations from labor-exporting states (e.g.
Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain) (Table 3). Of all Community peoples
Greeks, Italians, Portuguese, and Spaniards are trusted least by West
Germans. Spaniards, Italians, and Greeks are rated as least trustworthy
by Britons.
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
The suspicions northerners harbor toward southern Europeans could,
of course, dissipate in the future as Greece, Portugal, and Spain become
longer-established members of the European Community. However, it is
just as likely, if not more likely, that these suspicions will deepen,
as the transitional periods for the entry of new member countries
(recently expired for Greece and until 1992 for Portugal and Spain) end
and migrants from these countries increase and circulate more freely
within the EC. In this context, the decision of West Germany in 1986 to
abrogate a treaty obligation which would have allowed Turkish workers
greater access to the German labor movement bodes ill for the future of
the EC's free movement of labor policy (Katzenstein, 1987: 266).
Although Turkey remains outside the EC, the West German action
demonstrates the ease with which a government, which stands to gain
politically by opposing the immigration of foreign workers, can
circumvent a long-standing agreement on the movement of labor.
Moreover, the West German decision demonstrates that a liberal
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immigration policy is not without its potential, political costs, costs
which a particular Community government at a given moment in time may
not be prepared to accept.
The formal admittance of Turkey into the EC would probably only
further exacerbate latent divisions within the Community. It is well
known that Turks are deeply distrusted in Greece and West Germany. Less
well known, but equally important for assessing the impact of Turkey's
entry into the EC on the Community's labor policy, is the fact that
Turkish citizens are viewed more negatively than positively in every
Community country except Denmark. Indeed, in the Community as a whole
Turks are seen as less trustworthy than the Soviets or the Chinese
(Euro-barometre, 1986).
CONCLUSION
For the most part, the political costs of the EC's free movement of
labor policy have hitherto been minor, as general conditions of high
unemployment and low economic growth in much of Western Europe since the
mid-1970s have discouraged the mass migration of Community workers from
one EC country to another. In the early 1980s citizens of the Community
and the acceeding countries living in other EC countries numbered 4.9
million, or less than one-third of all foreigners residing within the
European Community. Turkey alone had as many foreign residents in the
EC as Italy and Spain combined (European Communities, 1985). Moreover,
as we argued above, the full impact on the EC's labor policy of adding
Greece, Portugal, and Spain to the Community is not yet apparent. The
transitional period for the entry of Greece into the Community ended
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only recently and Spanish and Portuguese citizens do not gain complete
freedom of movement within the EC until the end of 1992. As traditional
labor-exporting states, these three countries can be expected to supply
the EC with most of its new migrant workers during the rest of this
century. How large this migration will eventually be and how well the
foreign workers from these countries will be received by their host
societies will not be known until perhaps the mid-1990s.
In the interim, the steady advance of anti-immigrant illiberalism
in Western Europe threatens to erode the EC's commitment to the free
movement of labor within the Community, and to delay the integration
within European society of newly-settled foreign workers from non-
Community countries. Specifically, anti-immigrant illiberalism
threatens to expose the contradictions inherent in the advocacy by
Community governments of a Europe without borders and the encouragement
many of these governments have implicitly or explicitly given to
xenophobic political forces. How these contradictions will ultimately
be resolved cannot be foreseen. However, what can be foreseen is that
the political costs of the EC's free movement of labor policy will
increase during the 1990s and beyond. These costs will be considerable
regardless of future economic conditions in Western Europe and whether
or not Turkey and possibly other labor-exporting countries are admitted
into the European Community.
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Table I
FOREIGN POPULATION OF THE MAJOR LABOR-RECEIVING COUNTRIES
Country Foreign Population Percent Total Population
Austria 272,300 3.6
Belgium 897,630 9.1
France 4,485,715 8.2
Netherlands 558,710 3.9
Sweden 390,565 4.7
Switzerland 839,671 13.0
United Kingdom 2,151,000 3.8
West Germany 4,378,942 7.2
Source: Frey and Lubinski, 1987.
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Table 2
ANTI-IMMIGRATION FORCES IN WESTERN EUROPE SINCE 1970
Party/Movement
Belgium
Denmark
France
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Switzerland
United Kingdom
West Germany
National Front
Progress Party
National Front
Italian Social Movement
Center Party
Progress Party
Automobile Supporters Party
National Action
Republican Party
British Movement
National Front
Free German Workers Party
German Peoples Union
National Democratic Party
24
Country
Table 3
TRUST IN PEOPLES OF OTHER EC COUNTRIES*
Trustworthiness
Peoples Very Fairly Not Very Not at All DK Index
Danes 14% 38% 10% 4% 34% .59
Dutch 15 41 11 4 29 .56
Luxembourgers 11 39 10 4 36 .54
Belgians 10 42 13 5 30 .46
Germans 15 40 15 11 19 .32
Irish 9 33 18 9 31 .17
French 12 37 21 11 19 .15
British 11 38 23 11 17 .15
Spanish 7 38 26 9 20 .08
Greeks 8 31 21 10 30 .06
Portuguese 8 30 20 11 31 .04
Italians 8 34 28 10 20 .03
*Community of 12 as a whole: weighted average
Source: Euro-Barometre, 1986.
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